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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(j) (1989 as amended), and Article 
VIII, Sections 3 and 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in failing to allow additional 
time to conduct discovery in accordance with Defendants/ 
Appellants1 Rule 56(f) Affidavit; and in failing to make findings 
relative thereto? 
2. Did the trial court err in granting Plaintiff/ 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and specifically finding 
that the Plaintiff/Respondent did not violate the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated §7-1-101 et seq. (1981 as amended)? 
3. Did the trial court err on dismissing Defendants/ 
Appellants' Counterclaim as not stating a cause of action upon 
which relief could be granted? 
The standard of review for this Court when considering a 
challenge to summary judgment granted in the lower court is well 
settled and is as follows: 
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and 
deciding in whether the trial court properly granted 
judgment as to a matter of law to the prevailing party, 
we give no deference to the trial court's view of the 
law; we review it for correctness. 
1 
Whatcott v. Whatcott, 131 Utah Adv. Rpts. 97 (Utah Ct. App. 
4/4/90). Additionally, this Court is obligated to review the 
facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom 
summary judgment was granted. Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P. 2d 281, 
283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND CASE LAW 
Appellants contend that there is one Rule of Civil Procedure 
and two statutes which are dispositive of the issues raised on 
appeal. 
As it relates to the issue of whether or not the trial court 
erred in granting Defendant/Appellants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the pleadings and affidavits, Appellants believe that 
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is dispositive. 
The Rule states as follows: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated 
present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained, or depositions to be taken, 
or discovery to be had, or make such other orders as is 
just. 
As it relates to whether or not the trial court committed 
error in granting summary judgment on the Plaintiff/Respondentfs 
Complaint and in dismissing the Counterclaim, Utah Code Annotated 
§7-1-702 is dispositive: 
2 
Other than a national bai ik, a federal savings bai ik, or 
a savings and loan association lawfully using the words 
" savi ngs bank" in its name, and authorized to do 
business under Chapter 7, no person not authorized to 
conduct the banking business under Chapter 3 may 
transact business in this state under any name, or use 
any name or sign, or circulate or use any letterhead or 
bill head which contains the "bank", "banker", or 
"banking", or any other word or combination of words 
indicating that the business is the business of a 
bank. Such a person may not advertise or represent in 
any manner which indicates or reasonably implies that 
its business is of the character or kind carried on by 
a bank, or which is to likely to lead any person 
reasonably to believe that it's business is that of a 
bank or, in. the case of a federal or state savings 
bank, that its business is other than that of a savings 
bank. . . . (emphasis added). 
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based upon a Promissory Note signed by the Defendant/Appellants. 
The $100,000.00 represents loan fees charged by the Plaintiff/ 
Respondent as part of a loan provided by the Plaintiff/ 
Respondent to the Defendant/Appellants to build a retail shopping 
center. The Defendant/Appellants contend that the Plaintiff/ 
Respondent is not entitled to collect under the note because of 
the Plaintiff's violation of Utah banking laws and explicitly 
based upon the Plaintiff/Respondent's action in holding itself 
out as a bank when it was not registered or licensed to so act 
within the State of Utah. Additionally, Defendant/Appellants 
contend that they were damaged by the Plaintiff/Respondent's 
breach of contract and that they are entitled to recover the same 
from the Plaintiff/Respondent. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
1. Plaintiff/Respondent filed its Complaint on January 10, 
1991 seeking judgment against the Defendants/Appellants based 
upon a Promissory Note for the principal amount of $100,000.00, 
together with interest, costs and attorney's fees. 
Plaintiff/Respondent also sought the same judgment against the 
individual Defendants/Appellants based upon their execution of 
guarantees. (R. la-16.) 
2. The Defendants/Appellants prepared and filed an Answer 
and Counterclaim on March 11, 1991. The Defendants/Appellants, 
4 
\.
 A ._, < . « ? W P . T , n 
a f f i r m a t i v e Jefens* tb<- i-n-t *!- • '1aintiff/Respondent hold 
M >,, ' • .\-' I1. * -'^ personnel were b a n k e r s , and as 
a reoult theitu. , t ><; Pjajiii-i : y Lc^ t lent violated the expli clt 
term:-', of a s La tute precluding their right I: : collect on the 
* * : - B y * ; a i ; • : I: C : 1 L i I : e i: c 1 a it " m I: 1 • = • D > 3 f e n d a n t s / 
Appellants contended that as a result of the misrepresentatioi i of 
t - Plaintiff/Respondent as to its banking status, and further 
I ' ] a :i i I t :ii f f / R e s p o n d e i i, I:' s "I a :: 1 c :: f d I s c "I o s i 11: e 1:1: i e 
Defendants/Appallants have been damaged for wl lich damage they 
^ero entitled to recover against the Plaintiff/Respondent. (R. 
) 
3. On March 1 3, 1991, Defendant/Appell ants submitted to 
Plaintiff/Responden; Interrogatories ami Request ; OJ Production 
) 
4 . w:* . i c i t c n * i n n i p l n i n t i f f /Respondent f i l ed i t s 
Motion for Summary 'T.ri'.ii'f't n.J M';i i'.-n : Dismiss Counterclaim 
5. ^ ^l.
 s MirAiLi i{oj[)unu(jn u mailed to 
Defendants/Appel iai is" counsel, Responses to the Request for 
Production of Documents and Answers to in te r rogator ies , (K, 64-
) 
5 
6. Defendants/Appellants prepared and filed with the Court 
on April 16, 1991 a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
opposition to the Plaintiff/Respondentfs Motion for Summary 
Judgment and to dismiss Counterclaim with supporting affidavits. 
Within the documents filed with the Court, Defendants/Appellants 
sought additional time to conduct discovery. (R. 88-156.) 
7. Plaintiff/Respondent filed a Reply Memorandum in 
support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and to dismiss the 
Counterclaim on April 23, 1991. (R. 157-168.) 
8. As part of the Affidavit submitted in response to the 
Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment and 
to Dismiss Counterclaim, counsel for the Defendant/Appellants 
prepared and filed a Rule 56(f) Affidavit requesting additional 
time to conduct discovery. (R. 147-150.) 
9. Plaintiff/Respondent filed a Motion to Strike the 
Affidavits of I. N. Fisher and Gary J. Anderson on April 23, 
1991. (R. 169-175.) 
10. The Court conducted oral arguments on August 14, 1991. 
As a result thereof, the Court ruled from the bench by denying 
the Plaintiff/Respondentfs Motion to Strike Affidavits, granting 
Plaintiff/Respondentfs Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, based upon 
the Court finding no issue of material fact. The Court further 
6 
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1. As a result of a construction loan application, the 
Plaintiff/Respondent committed to loan to the Defendants/ 
Appellants the sum of $2,100,000.00 for the building of a retail 
shopping center located at 300 East 6400 South in Salt Lake City, 
Utah containing approximately 29,288 square feet of leasable 
area. The total loan fees that were to be charged by the 
Plaintiff/Respondent consisted of $42,000.00. (See Construction 
Loan Commitment Letter dated October 3, 1985, R. 106-117.) 
2. Subsequent thereto, the Plaintiff/Respondent changed 
its position with regard to the amount of the fees to be charged 
to the Defendants/Appellants for the making of the loan. 
Attached to the Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, is 
a letter signed by the representatives of the Plaintiff/ 
Respondent and representatives of the Defendants/Appellants under 
which the loan fees associated with the financing were raised to 
a staggering $144,000.00. As noted in Section 2 of that 
document, the $100,000.00 additional fee was termed "contingent" 
and was to be due and payable upon the sale of the property, 
refinancing of the loan, or at loan maturity as may be extended, 
whichever comes first. (R. 118-19.) 
3. When the actual loan documents were actually prepared 
and the transaction was closed between the Plaintiff/Respondent 
and the Defendants/Appellants, the contingent $100,000.00 fee was 
8 
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consumma be the long term financing with First Seci irity Bank, the 
Defendants/Appellants were required to execute in favor of the 
Plaintiff/Respondent a Promissory Note, Trust Deed, Unconditional 
Guaranty, and Security Agreement executed in favor of the 
Plaintiff/Respondent and the amount of $100,000.00 together with 
interest. (R. 127-140) 
7. As set out hereinabove, there is no question that the 
$100,000.00 represented by the Promissory Note is for nothing 
more than a construction loan fee charged by the Plaintiff/ 
Respondent over and above the $44,000.00 paid at the time of 
closing. 
8. Mr. I. N. Fisher, one of the Defendants/Appellants and 
principals of the corporate Defendant/Appellants signed and filed 
an Affidavit on April 22, 1991. In the Affidavit, Mr. Fisher 
testified that The Bradford Group, the Plaintiff/Respondent 
herein, through its agents and employees, held itself out as a 
banking organization and its personnel as bankers. Mr. Fisher 
testified by way of affidavit that if the Court, as part of its 
determination awarded the Defendants/Appellants the costs, 
interest and fees that they had paid to the Plaintiff/Respondent, 
that amount would equal $468,986.53. If the Court granted 
prejudgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum as allowed by 
statute, prejudgment interest on that amount to the time of the 
filing of the Complaint would be an additional $158,213.44. 
10 
As noted in Mr. Fisher's Affidavit, the Plaintiff/ 
Respondent, through its agents and employees, in addition to 
holding themselves out as bankers, represented to the Defendants/ 
Appellants that The Bradford Group was the source of the 
$2,200,000.00, and further, that the Plaintiff/Respondent would 
not press the collection of the $100,000.00 against the 
Defendants/Appellants, as long as the Defendant/Appellants were 
moving forward in good faith to pay the same. As recited in Mr. 
Fisher's Affidavit, the negotiations and parties involved would 
have been different if the Defendant/Appellants had known that 
the Plaintiff/Respondent, instead of providing the loan proceeds, 
was simply brokering the loan on behalf of other financial 
institutions. The Defendants/Appellants would then know that the 
Plaintiff/Respondent had no right or authority to make 
representations to the Defendants/Appellants that it would not 
press the collection of the $100,000.00. Obviously, the 
Plaintiff/Respondent would not have any authority to extend the 
$100,000.00 inasmuch as the money belonged to other financial 
institutions. (R. 151-56) 
9. Plaintiff/Respondent admits that it used the word 
"bank" and "banker" on its stationery and business cards. (R. 
49, 56) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant/Appellants contend that the District Court 
erred in granting summary judgment in this matter. First, the 
Defendants/Appellants contend that the Court should have allowed 
additional discovery relative to the issues outlined in the 
Plaintiff/RespondentTs Complaint and also, the issues raised by 
the Defendants/Appellants in their Counterclaim. The Appellants 
contend that the Court's granting of summary judgment without 
allowing additional discovery was error and in contravention of 
Rule 56 and the interpreting case law. 
Secondly, Appellants contend that on the merits, the Court 
cannot grant judgment in favor of the Plaintiff/Respondent for 
the $100,000.00 together with interest and attorney's fees 
because said amount represents loan fees as opposed to the actual 
loan proceeds. The Appellants contend that because the 
Plaintiff/Respondent violated state statute and misrepresented 
its status to the Defendants/Appellants, it should be barred from 
receiving any benefits from that misrepresentation by way of 
payment of interest, costs, fees or the like. The Defendants/ 
Appellants contend that although a person need not be licensed to 
loan money to another person in this state, that the Plaintiff/ 
Respondent's misrepresentation as to its status as a bank, 
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warrants a forfeiture of the benefit of the arrangement with the 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Lastly, the Defendants/Appellants contend that the Court 
erred in dismissing their Counterclaim* The Defendants/Appellants 
contend that their Counterclaim is viable and states the cause of 
action which relief should be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING ON THE ISSUES SURROUNDING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHOUT ALLOWING DEFENDANTS ADDITIONAL 
TIME FOR DISCOVERY 
As outlined above, it is the Defendant/Appellants' 
contention in this case that the Plaintiff/Respondent, in 
contravention of state statute, held itself out as a "bank." The 
Defendants/Appellants contend that the statute prohibits any 
entity who is not properly licensed and authorized, to make that 
representation to the public. It is the Defendant/Appellants1 
contention that the Plaintiff/Respondent, by violating state 
statute and misrepresenting its status to the general public 
forgoes any profit it might obtain by virtue of the 
misrepresentation. In this case, the Plaintiff/Respondent was 
repaid $2,100,000.00 and accordingly, any issue relating to the 
payment of the principal of the loan was eliminated. What the 
Defendant/Appellants seeks by way of these proceedings is a 
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pronouncement by the Court that the $100,000.00 fee should be 
forfeited based upon the Plaintiff/Respondentfs statutory 
violation and misrepresentation. 
Obviously, the Defendants/Appellants are entitled to 
information from the Plaintiff/Respondent as to the governmental 
entities with whom it was licensed and registered. The 
Defendants/Appellants are also entitled to learn what advertise-
ments and other representations were made to the general public 
relative to its status. 
The Defendants/Appellants, in their Counterclaim contend 
that the Plaintiff/Respondent affirmatively misrepresented its 
status as a "bank" to the Defendants/Appellants, and further, 
misrepresented to the Defendants/Appellants the source from which 
the $2.2 million would be obtained. The latter representation was 
very significant because the agents and employees of the 
Plaintiff/Respondent represented to the Defendants/Appellants 
that as long as the Defendants/Appellants were moving forward in 
good faith to sell the shopping complex, that appropriate 
extensions would be given on the due date of the $100,000.00. If 
Defendants/Appellants had known that the Plaintiff/Respondent was 
not in fact the person who loaned the $2.2 million, it would have 
apparent to all that the Plaintiff/Respondent was without any 
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ability to represent when extensions would be granted concerning 
the $100,000.00 Note. 
Additionally, the Defendants/Appellants are clearly entitled 
to discovery as to the identity of other financial institutions 
who loaned the money used to finance the Defendants/Appellants' 
loan. The Defendants/Appellants are entitled to know the 
contractual agreement between the Plaintiff/Respondent and third 
party entities. The Defendants/Appellants would also be entitled 
to know what correspondence or dealings there were between the 
Plaintiff/Respondent and third party entities, relative to 
extensions surrounding the $100,000.00. Finally, discovery would 
be appropriate to determine if the third party entities who 
actually provided the money in this case, were made aware of the 
dealings between the Plaintiff/Respondent and Defendants/ 
Appellants, and the representations of the Plaintiff/Respondent 
as to their status as a bank, and also as to extensions of time 
to pay the $100,000.00. 
As detailed in the Statement of Facts, the Defendants/ 
Appellants sent Interrogatories and Request for Production of 
Documents. A copy of the Answers to Interrogatories and Response 
to Request for Production of Documents are attached to this Brief 
as the Addendum. A cursory review of the Answers to Interrog-
atories clearly reveals the evasive tactics taken by the 
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Plaintiff/Respondent in answering the Interrogatories and the 
Plaintiff/Respondentfs failure to provide any real substantive 
information in response to the Interrogatories. 
Based upon the absence of the needed information, counsel 
for Defendants/Appellants, Gary J. Anderson, filed a Rule 56(f) 
Affidavit on April 16, 1991. 
The Court, in scheduling arguments on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in its ruling on the pending motions, failed to 
address the issues raised by counsel's Affidavit and explicit 
argument to the Court that additional time was necessary to 
conduct the needed discovery. (Anderson Affidavit, R. 147-150; 
Argument relating to the need for additional discovery, R. 101-
105. ) 
A. THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE APPROPRIATE FINDINGS ON THE 
DISCOVERY ISSUE. 
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states as 
follows: 
Should i t appear from t h e a f f i d a v i t s of a p a r t y 
opposing the motion tha t he cannot for reasons s t a t ed 
p r e s e n t by a f f i d a v i t e s s e n t i a l t o j u s t i f y h i s 
opposi t ion, the court may refuse the appl ica t ion for judgment o r may o r d e r a c o n t i n u a n c e t o p e r m i t 
a f f i dav i t s to be obtained or deposi t ions to be taken, 
or discovery to be had, or may make such other order as 
i s j u s t . 
This Court and the Court of Appeals have ruled in a long 
l i ne of cases t ha t a case wi l l be reversed or remanded where 
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findings were inadequate to support the conclusions. See 
generally Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623, 626-27 (Utah 1987); 
Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986); Marchant v. 
Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 203 (Utah App. 1987). 
The status of this record is that counsel for the 
Defendant/Appellants filed a Rule 56(f) Affidavit, arguing by 
affidavit and brief that summary judgment should not be granted 
until additional time for discovery was allowed. The record is 
devoid of any ruling by the trial court relative to the issues 
raised by the Rule 56(f) Affidavit. It is respectfully submitted 
that Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, when 
implemented by the filing of an appropriate affidavit, requires a 
ruling from the Court as to the status of discovery and a ruling 
on the request for additional time. The absence of a ruling on 
the discovery request robs the Appellant of a chance to prepare 
his case and the appellate court is deprived of the factual 
basis relied upon by the lower court. 
B. THE APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN ORDER REVERSING THE 
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER THE 
CONTINUATION OF DISCOVERY. 
The Appellate Courts in Utah have been active with regard to 
the right of the trial court to grant summary judgment when 
appropriate affidavits filed in accordance with Rule 56(f) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have been filed. The Court of 
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Appeals dealt with the issue in Downtown Athletic Club v. S.N. 
Horman, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1987). In addressing the issue, 
the Court stated: 
Generally, summary judgment should not be granted if 
discovery is incomplete since information sought in 
discovery may create genuine issues of fact sufficient 
to defeat the motion. 
Id. at 278. See also Auerbach?s Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376, 
377 (Utah 1977). 
There are specific standards which the trial court should 
apply in determining whether further discovery is appropriate 
before ruling on a motion for summary judgment. The Utah 
Supreme Court delineated those factors in Cox v. Winters, 678 
P.2d 311, 313-14 (Utah 1984): 
1. Were the reasons articulated in the Rule 56(f) 
Affidavit "adequate", or is the party against whom 
summary judgment is sought merely on a "fishing 
expedition" for purely speculative facts after 
substantial discovery has been conducted without 
producing any significant evidence? 
2. Was there sufficient time since the inception 
of the lawsuit for the party against whom summary 
judgment is sought to use discovery procedures, and 
thereby cross-examine that the moving party? 
3. If discovery procedures were timely 
initiated, was the non-moving party afforded an 
appropriate response? 
It is respectfully submitted that the discovery requested in 
the Rule 56(f) Affidavit is entirely appropriate and relevant. 
The Defendants/Appellants are clearly entitled to discover where 
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the monies lent to the Defendants/Appellants originated. That 
fact is very significant in this matter. The Defendants/ 
Appellants will testify that the Plaintiff/Respondent agreed to 
roll over the $100,000.00 Note as long as the Defendants/ 
Appellants were making reasonable efforts with regard thereto. 
Had the Defendants/Appellants known that the money was actually 
being loaned by a third party who could require the loan to be 
paid at any time regardless of the Defendants/Appellants' 
progress, Defendants/Appellants would have acted differently. 
Regardless, such would constitute a material misstatement of fact 
entitling the Defendants/Appellants to damages. Corroboration of 
the dealings between the Plaintiff/Respondent and Defendants/ 
Appellants could be obtained by tracing the Plaintiff/ 
Respondent's dealings with other entities at the same period of 
time, which is also requested in the Rule 56(f) Affidavit. 
Finally, facts relating to the representations made by the 
agents and employees of the Plaintiff/Respondent to the 
Defendant/ Appellants with regard to its standing as a financial 
institution is key to this matter inasmuch as the Court ruled as 
a matter of law that the Plaintiff/Respondent was not a banking 
institution and did not violate the Utah Financial Institutions 
Act. 
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If one reviews the three findings made by the trial court, 
it is clear that the finding of the court did not even address 
the Counterclaim and the need for further discussion. The issue 
as to whether "fees" may be recovered by an entity holding itself 
out as a banking organization was not addressed; and further, the 
alleged misrepresentation of material fact claimed in the 
Counterclaim was not even addressed. It is respectfully submitted 
that Rule 56(f) clearly entitles the Defendant/Appellants to a 
summary reversal of the Order of the District Court on the issues 
raised by the Counterclaim. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENTTS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS COMPLAINT 
A, THE EXISTENCE OF ANY ISSUE OF FACT WARRANTS A REVERSAL OF 
THE DISTRICT COURTTS GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The standard of review when considering a challenge to 
summary judgment is well settled in Utah case law: 
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and in 
deciding whether the trial court properly granted 
judgment as to a matter of law to the prevailing party, 
we give no deference to the trial court's view of the 
law; we review it for correctness. 
Whatcott v. Whatcott, 131 Utah Adv. Rpts. 97 (Utah Ct. of App. 
4/4/90), 98; see also Ceco Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 
772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 1989). 
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Further, the Appellate Court is to review the facts in the 
light most favorable to the losing party. See Briggs v. Holcomb, 
740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. of App. 1987); Whatcott v. Whatcott, 
131 Utah Adv. Rpts. 97 (Utah Ct. of App. 1990); Phemy v. Segal 
Enterprises, 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 1979); First American 
Commerce Co. v. Washington Mutual Savings Bank, 66 Utah Adv. 
Rpts 19 (Utah Ct. of App. 9/21/87); Blue Cross Blue Shield v. 
State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989). Further, the Appellate 
Court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusion. 
Whatcott, supra, at 98; Bergen v. Travelers Insurance Co., 776 
P.2d 659, 662 (Utah Ct. of App. 1989); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis 
National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). 
In sum, summary judgment may only be sustained if there are 
no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as viewed by the 
Appellate Court. See TransAmerica Cash Reserve v. Dixie Power, 
789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990); Webb v. R.O.A. General, 152 Utah 
Adv. Rpts. (Utah Ct. of App. 1991). 
Finally, as it relates to any dispute in the evidence 
itself, the district court has been explicitly instructed not to 
waive or resolve disputed evidence. Territorial Savings & Loan 
Assoc, v. Baird, 781 P. 2d 452 (Utah 1989); Hardy v. Prudential 
Insur. Co. of America, 763 P.2d 761, 765 (Utah 1988); W. N. 
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Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 
1981). As powerfully stated by the Court of Appeals in Lucky 7 
Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct. of App. 1988): 
We liberally construe the facts and view the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion. Id. Moreover, because a summary judgment is 
granted as a matter of law rather than fact, we are 
free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusion. 
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 
(Utah 1987); Oberhansly, 751 P.2d at 156; K.O. v. 
Denison, 748 P.2d 588, 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). After 
reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to 
appellant, if we conclude there is a dispute as to a 
material issue of fact, we must reverse the trial 
court's determination and remand for trial on that 
issue. Atlas, 737 P.2d at 229; Denison, 748 P.2d at 
590. It is inappropriate for courts to weigh disputed 
material facts in ruling on a summary judgment. Spor 
v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304, 
1308 (Utah 1987); W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural 
Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981); Oberhansly, 
751 P.2d at 1156. It matters not that the evidence on 
one side may appear to be strong or even compelling. 
Spor, 740 P.2d at 1308; Oberhansly, 751 P.2d at 1156. 
One sworn statement under oath is all that is needed to 
dispute the averment on the other side of the 
controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding the 
entry of summary judgment. W.M. Barnes, 627 P.2d at 59, 
Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). 
Id. at 752. 
B. THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT VIOLATE THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT OF 1981 (UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED §7-1-101 ET SEQ.), CONSTITUTES MANIFEST 
ERROR. 
The provisions of Utah Code Annotated, §7-1-701 (1981 as 
amended) could not be clearer in prohibiting any person from 
representing themselves as a banking organization without fully 
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complying with the statutes and regulations promulgated by the 
Department of Financial Institutions. Utah Code Annotated, §7-1-
701(1) (1981 as amended) states as follows: 
It is unlawful for any person not authorized to conduct 
a business subject to the jurisdiction of this 
department to use a name, sign, advertisement, 
letterhead, or other printed matter which represents, 
or in any other manner to represent to the public that 
that person, or place of business, is a financial 
institution, or is conducting a business which is 
subject to the jurisdiction of the department. 
In paragraph 15 of Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed 
Material Facts in its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 49, 66), the 
Plaintiff/Respondent acknowledges that in fact it held itself out 
as a "realty investment banker." The Affidavits of the Defendant 
I.N. Fisher herein explicitly sets forth that not only was the 
representation that the Plaintiff/Respondent was engaged as an 
authorized banker made by virtue of stationery and business 
cards, it was also part of the "pitch" made by the 
representatives of the P1aintiff/Respondent to the 
Defendants/Appellants throughout the entire transaction. 
The seriousness of using the word "bank" in letterhead, 
stationery or in representations made to the public when the 
entity is not a financial institution is demonstrated by Utah 
Code Annotated, §7-1-701(2): 
23 
Other than a national bank, a federal savings bank, or 
a savings and loan association lawfully using the words 
"savings bank" in its name and authorized to do 
business under Chapter 7, no person not authorized to 
conduct the banking business under Chapter 3 may 
transact business in this state under any name, or use 
any name or sign, or circulate or use any letterhead or 
bill head which contains the word "bank", "banker", or 
"banking", or any other word or combination of words 
indicating that the business is the business of a bank. 
Such a person may not advertise or represent in any 
manner which indicates or reasonably implies that its 
business is of the character or kind carried on by a 
bank or which is likely to lead any person reasonably 
to believe that its business is that of a bank or, in 
the case of a federal or state savings bank, that its 
business is other than that of a savings bank. . . . 
(emphasis added) 
See also Utah Code Annotated §7-3-2(2) (1989 as amended). 
The Plaintiff, in response, contended that it was not a bank 
and not subject to the provisions of the Financial Institutions 
Act. The trial court in its findings found that the Plaintiff/ 
Respondent was not a banking institution. The error of the 
District Court is apparent. The clear meaning and intent of the 
Financial Institutions Act is to keep entities and persons who 
were not in fact banks and bankers, and thereby subject to the 
Financial Institutions Act, from holding themselves out as banks, 
bankers or mortgage bankers and thus deceive the public. There 
is no dispute in the evidence that the Plaintiff/Respondent in 
fact held itself out as a mortgage banker and used the term 
"bank" in its letterhead, cards, advertisements and in its 
discussions with the Defendant. Accordingly, the Plaintiff/ 
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Respondent violated the Utah Financial Institutions Act when in 
fact it was not a financial institution subject to the provisions 
of the Utah Statute. It is impossible and contrary to the 
evidence to hold that the Plaintiff/Respondent was neither a bank 
thereby not subject to the Financial Institutions Act; find that 
the Defendant used "bank" in its name and that its 
representatives held the organization out as a bank and yet not 
find that the Defendant violated the Utah Financial Institutions 
Act. 
The Defendants' theory with regard to the Utah Financial 
Institutions Act is simple. The Act specifically forbids any 
person or entity to use terms such as "bank", "banker", "mortgage 
banker" when it in fact is not an entity regulated by the Utah 
Financial Institutions Act. The purpose of the legislation is to 
protect the public from persons or entities who represent 
themselves as financial institutions, when in fact they are not. 
It is inconceivable that the District Court could hold, in 
accordance with the Affidavits and admissions of the Plaintiff, 
that the Plaintiff's agents and employees represented itself as a 
bank, while not actually being a bank governed by the Financial 
Institutions Act, and yet did not violate the Utah Financial 
Institutions Statute. The Utah Financial Institutions Act, Utah 
Code Annotated §7-1-101 et seq. has two purposes. The first is 
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to proscribe the use of terms such as "bank", "banker" and 
"mortgage banker" and avoid misrepresentation to the public, and 
secondly, to properly control entities that are in fact 
institutions who properly may be called banks or financial 
institutions. 
There is only one provision within the Act that would allow 
a person to use terms used by the Plaintiff/Respondent and not be 
in violation of the Act. Utah Code Annotated §7-1-701(8)(a) 
states: 
Notwithstanding any other restriction in this section, 
the prohibition of the use of specific names and words 
in subsection (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) does not apply 
if the effect of the use of the name or word would not 
likely lead any person reasonably to believe that a 
person or his place of business is a financial 
institution, or is conducting a business subject to the 
jurisdiction of the department. 
The statutory language outlined above was to clarify the 
intent of the legislation and make sure that the persons who use 
phrases such as "food bank", or "blood bank" are not drawn within 
the legislative scheme. As applied to the facts of this case, 
the Plaintiff's agents and employees represented themselves as a 
financial institution and the Defendants/Appellants clearly fall 
within the persons sought to be protected by the Act. 
C. THE CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE UTAH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT 
PROHIBITS 
THE 
THE 
DEFENDANT 
PLAINTIFF 
AND THE 
FROM 
FAILURE 
SEEKING 
OF THE 
TO COLLECT 
TRIAL COURT 
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FIND 
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The leading case dealing with implied civil claims from 
statutes or regulations with specific remedies other than civil 
remedies is Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1974). In that case, the 
Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether a civil or 
private claim was implied from a federal statute that 
specifically provided a criminal penalty. In determining whether 
a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing 
one, the Court stated as follows: 
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in 
a statute not expressly providing one, several factors 
are relevant. First, is the plaintiff "one of the 
class for whose especial benefit the statute was 
enacted," [citing case] - that is, does the statute 
create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, 
is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or 
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? 
[citing cases] Third, is it consistent with the underlying 
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy 
for the plaintiff? [citing cases] And finally, is the cause 
of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an 
area basically the concern of the states so that it would be 
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on 
federal law? [citing cases and authority] 
Id. at 78. See also Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 191, 201-202 (1967); see also J.I. Case Co. v. 
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964); Texas and Pacific R. Co. v. 
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916). 
The subsequent decisions, the United States Supreme Court 
has reaffirmed the four tests outlined above. However, the more 
recent cases establish that Cort, supra did not determine "that 
each of the factors is entitled to equal weight. The central 
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inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either 
expressly or by implication, a private cause of action." Touch 
Ross and Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 
2489, 61 L. Ed. 2d 82, 96 (1979); see also Middlesex County 
Sewage Authority v. National C. Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1, 
13, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2622, 69 L. Ed. 2d 435, 446 (1981); 
Universityfs Research Assoc, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770, 
101 S. Ct. 1451, 1461, 67 L. Ed 2d 662, 675 (1981). 
In determining whether Congress intended to create a private 
remedy, the Supreme Court has held that: "the failure of Congress 
expressly to consider a private remedy is not inevitably 
inconsistent with an intent on its part to make such a remedy 
available." Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 
U.S. 11, 18, 100 S. Ct. 242, 246, 62 L. Ed. 2d 146, 154 (1979). 
The intent to make the remedy available may appear "implicitly in 
the language or structure of the statute, or in circumstances of 
its enactment." Id. 
Before addressing the specific tests outlined in Cort, 
supra,, it should be noted that generally, courts imply a private 
cause of action based upon a continuous line of decisions in the 
Supreme Court of the United States providing for civil actions by 
private persons based upon violations of penal statutes. The Utah 
Financial Institutions Act, upon which the Defendants/Appellants 
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base their defense makes the violation a crime. See Wandotte, 
supra. 
As to the first question raised in Cort, supra, whether or 
not the Defendants/Appellants herein constitute one of the class 
for whose benefit the statute was enacted, reference should be 
made to the legislative findings and intent which is contained in 
Utah Code Annotated, §7-1-102 (1981 as amended). In subpart A 
thereof, it is stated: 
The legislature finds that it is in the public interest 
to strengthen the regulation, supervision, and 
examination of persons, firms, corporations, 
associations and other business entities furnishing 
financial services to the people of this state, or 
owning and controlling those businesses. 
Accordingly, it is the purpose of this title to expand 
and strengthen the duties, powers and responsibilities 
of the Department of Financial Institutions and to place 
under its jurisdiction all classes of institutions and other 
businesses engaged in furnishing financial services to the 
people of this state, or owning or controlling those 
businesses. . . . 
Utah Code Annotated, §7-1-102(1)(A). 
Utah Code Annotated, §7-1-701 cannot be interpreted any 
other way than designating the public as the primary party to be 
protected by the statute, requiring representations of financial 
institutions to be restricted and controlled by the statutes and 
regulations promulgated by the Department of Financial 
Institutions. It is obvious that allowing anyone to hold 
themselves out as a financial institution, when in fact they were 
not authorized to do so, would both undermine the credibility 
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that the public has in the banking industry, and create 
opportunity for criminal exploitation of the public. The Loran 
Corporation and its principals are members of the general public, 
dealing with entities who represented themselves to be regulated 
and authorized financial institutions which the statute clearly 
seeks to protect. 
The second aspect of the Cort, 422 U.S. at 78, criteria is 
whether there is an indication of legislative intent, explicit or 
implicit, to create or deny a remedy. Violation of the Utah 
Financial Institutions Act is, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
§7-1-701(9) a Class A Misdemeanor. Utah Code Annotated §76-3-
201(2) relating to the province of the court in sentencing a 
violator of the criminal situation, states as follows: 
This chapter does not deprive the court of authority 
conferred by law to forfeit property, dissolve the 
corporation, suspend or cancel a license, or permit 
the removal of a person from office, cite for contempt 
or impose any other civil penalty. A civil penalty may 
be included in a sentence. (emphasis added) 
There is absolutely nothing in the statutory scheme 
encompassed in the Financial Institutions Act of 1981 that would 
preclude any kind of civil remedy for the violation of the 
statute. It is further clear that the statute clearly intends to 
set forth the protocol for the regulation of financial 
institutions, and thereby establish the duty that an entity has 
in order to represent itself as a bank. Implicit therein, is an 
attempt by the legislature to define and set the standard for 
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individuals or entities holding themselves out as financial 
institutions• 
The United States Supreme Court dealt with the same issue in 
Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of the City of 
New York, 463 U.S. 582, 103 S.Ct. 3221 (1983). In that case, the 
court noted that government enforcement alone is not a sufficient 
deterrent against unlawful and improper behavior. The court 
noted that regardless of the alternative administrative 
sanction, that the individual acts of discrimination still 
violate the law and can effectively only be remedied by 
compensatory relief. The court noted that any other approach to 
the subject could only encourage continued acts of bad faith and 
to stall private litigants in the knowledge that justice delayed 
would be justice denied. 
The third test is whether or not a civil cause of action is 
consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme. 
It is respectfully submitted that implying such a remedy for the 
Defendant in a case dealing with the corporation which has 
wrongfully held itself out to be a "bank", does fulfill the 
purpose of the regulatory statute. Allowing the Defendants/ 
Appellants herein to void the contractual obligation to the 
Plaintiff/Respondent of paying fees to an entity violating the 
statute does prevent the dangers of a corporation from obtaining 
benefit from its exploitation and violation of the Utah statutory 
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scheme. On the other hand, allowing a corporation who has 
illegally and improperly represented itself as a financial 
institution to retain the profits from that activity would be an 
affront to the entire statutory and legislative scheme created by 
the state. 
See Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 102 S.Ct. 
2540 (1982). 
Finally, it should be noted that in Cort, 422 U.S. at 78, 
the Court was asked to enforce an implied civil right of action 
where the state statutes specifically provided a remedy. 
Obviously, in the present case, we are only dealing with a state 
statute that is applicable, and therefore, there is no conflict 
between state and federal law. 
Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that a civil cause 
of action is in fact created by the statute, and considering the 
Plaintiff's violation of the statute, the Plaintiff/Respondent 
should be barred from collecting any profits associated with its 
improper and illegal activity. 
D. THE CONTRACT AND NOTE BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANTS 
FOR BANKING OR LOAN FEES IS VOID. 
Aside from the issues outlined above as to the creation of a 
civil cause of action from a statutory scheme, secondary sources 
and courts interpreting the issue generally have held that 
contracts entered into in connection with illegal banking are 
void. 
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The Plaintiff, in its Memorandum in Support of its Motion 
for Summary Judgment, cites one case, Shepherd v. Finance 
Associates of Auburn, 316 N.E. 2d 597 (Mass. 1974). In that 
case, it is true that the Supreme Court in fact refused, under 
the statutory scheme then in effect to void a private transaction 
on the basis of the violation of the banking law. However, the 
great weight of authority of cases dealing with the issue clearly 
indicates that the violation of the statute relating to banking 
voids the transaction. Most cases in which there is a 
distinction, the Court has held that the violation of the banking 
act does not void the obligation to repay loan amounts, but does 
in fact void any contract between the debtor and the creditor 
relating to fees, interest and the like. 
One of the first cases discussing the issue is Koven v. 
Cline, 245 A.D. 307, 280 N.Y.S. 814 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935). In 
that case, the court held explicitly that under the state of the 
law, that: 
this assumption disposes of appellant's 
contention that there may be no recovery because of the 
violation by the corporation, Section 140 of the 
Banking Law. Such a violation would render the note 
void, but there could be a recovery for money loaned, 
or money had and received. [Citing case]. 
In the Voluntary Association v. Goodman, 244 N.Y.S. 328, 137 
Misc. 388 (Mun. Ct. 1930), the court held that: 
The undisputed facts are that the plaintiff, a 
membership corporation, with no banking powers is 
engaged in the business of mutual banking in a manner 
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permitted only to credit unions, without having 
complied with the banking law and consequently, all 
notes received by it for loans made by it are made void 
by Section 140 of the Banking Law. 
Id. at 331. 
In Wonock Enterprises Corporation v. Berg, 151 N.Y.S. 2d 
241, 87 Misc. 544 (Sup. Ct. 1955), the Supreme Court for New York 
County stated: 
Furthermore, the transaction between Air-tite and 
plaintiff shows that there was not an unconditional 
sale of the acceptances. Plaintiff calls the 
transaction "the sale with recourse." Every sale of a 
negotiable instrument is with recourse unless otherwise 
specifically noted. Yet, in every sale there is no 
right in the purchaser to require a new security. It 
would appear that the practice of the parties here 
amounted in fact to a loan on the strength of 
acceptances (not necessarily those conveyed), rather 
than a purchase of any specific acceptances, and this 
practice being habitual, is evidenced by the contract, 
is a violation of the banking law. Collection of the 
instruments by the holder acting in violation of that 
law is prohibited. [Citing cases]. 
Id. at 243. 
As outlined above, some courts have used statutory schemes 
to void contracts and others have used the development of common 
law. The most recent approach is that violations to banking laws 
is not a defense to the actual loan monies lent to a borrower by 
an institution, but as it relates to contracts with that 
institution, including interest, loan fees, extension fees and 
the like, the violation of the banking laws voids those 
arrangements entirely. Following the reasoned approach, the 
Plaintiff/Respondent in this action has been paid the 
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$2,100,000.00 of loan monies and should now repay to the 
Defendant the interest, late fees, extension fees and attorney's 
fees previously collected by it and further be barred from 
pursuing the $100,000.00 brokerage fee which is the gravamen of 
the Plaintiff's Complaint. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION 
UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED 
As out l ined hereinabove, the Counterclaim seeks damages from 
the Plaintiff /Respondent based upon two separate t h e o r i e s . The 
f i r s t theory i s t ha t the Plaintiff/Respondent held i t s e l f out as 
a bank i n d i r e c t v i o l a t i o n of s t a t u t e . Based upon t h e 
m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i t s s t a t u s , the Defendants /Appel lan ts 
contend t h a t the Pla in t i f f /Respondent should be barred from 
c o l l e c t i n g i n t e r e s t , f e e s and e x p e n s e s f rom t h e 
D e f e n d a n t s / A p p e l l a n t s . In o t h e r words , t h e Defendan t s / 
Appel lants contend t h a t based upon the Pla in t i f f /Respondent ' s 
misrepresentat ion as to i t s banking s t a t u s , the Court should not 
allow them to r e a l i z e any p ro f i t from tha t misrepresenta t ion. 
The second theory i s t ha t the agents and employees of the 
P l a in t i f f /Responden t mis represen ted the source of the loan 
proceeds to the Defendants/Appellants, and fur ther misrepresented 
the a b i l i t y of the Plaintiff/Respondent to forego co l l ec t ion of 
the $100,000.00 as long as the Defendants/Appellants were making 
good f a i t h e f fo r t s to s e l l the complex. 
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In the argument in front of Judge Lewis, Plaintiff/ 
Respondent contended only that the Defendants/Appellants were 
precluded from going forward on the Counterclaim based upon the 
extension agreements they had signed with the Plaintiff. 
The fact that the Defendants/Appellants executed extension 
agreements does not nullify the fraudulent pre-contract 
representations made by the Plaintiff/Respondent with regard to 
the loan itself and the nature of the Plaintiff/Respondent 
generally. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial courts' 
granting of summary judgment in the matter of Union Bank v. 
Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985). In that case, the court 
stated: 
This general rule was stated contains an exception for 
fraud. Parol evidence is admissible to show the 
circumstances on which the contract was made for the 
purpose for which the writing was executed. This is so 
even after the writing is determined to be an 
integrated contract. Admitting parol evidence in such 
circumstances avoids the judicial enforcement of a 
writing that appears to be a binding integration, but 
in fact is not. What appears to be a complete and 
binding integrated agreement may be a forgery, a joke, 
a sham, or an agreement without consideration, or it 
may be voidable for fraud, duress, mistake, or the 
like, or it may be illegal. Such invalidating causes 
need not and commonly do not appear on the face of the 
writing. 
Id. at 665. See also Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 
607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980); Hot Springs National Bank v. Stoops, 
613 P.2d 710 (New Mexico 1980). 
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The Supreme Court further made it clear in Colonial Leasing 
Company of New England, Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Construction, 713 
P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), that the issue relating both to the pre-
contract discussions and the written document is a question to be 
decided by the trier of fact: 
Only when contract terms are complete, clear and 
unambiguous can they be interpreted by the judge on a 
motion for summary judgment [citing cases]. If the 
evidence is to the terms and agreement are in conflict, 
the intent of the parties as to the terms of the 
agreement are to be determine by the jury [citing 
cases]. 
Id. at 488. 
The importance of the underlying factual issues in this case 
are demonstrated by the Affidavit of the Defendant Irv Fisher. 
The Plaintiff/Respondent in this case represented itself as a 
banking organization. Further, the Plaintiff/Respondent 
represented that it was the entity that would in fact make the 
loan when, upon information and belief, it is alleged that the 
Plaintiff/Respondent in fact brokered a loan using Dino Bank and 
another bank in Idaho. The Plaintiff/Respondent made 
representations relative to the fact that it would work with the 
Defendants/Appellants with regard to the payment of the 
$100,000.00 loan, and although specific documents were executed 
extending the loans to a day certain, it was also explained to 
the Defendants/Appellants that the Plaintiff/Respondent would in 
fact work with the Defendants/Appellants in the payment of the 
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$100,000,00 based upon set criteria. If the Defendants/ 
Appellants had known that the Plaintiff/Respondent in fact was 
not the person who would be controlling the money and the demand 
therefore, the Defendants/Appellants could have used other 
entities to procure the money from or different negotiation 
strategy regarding the contracts surrounding the $100,000.00. 
In other words, if the Court found for any reason that the 
$100,000.00 was in fact collectible, there is still a fact issue 
regarding the representations made by the Plaintiff/Respondent 
prior to the initiation of the contracts, which issues need to be 
resolved by the trier of fact. 
One last point should be made. Even if the Court decided 
that the statutory language within the Financial Institutions Act 
did not create a private cause of action, the Court would still 
need to resolve the issue of whether or not the bank's 
representation of itself as a bank and the surrounding 
representations concerning the contract, violated the Plaintiff/ 
Respondent's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and 
whether or not there was a violation of the fiduciary duty the 
Plaintiff/Respondent has to the Defendants/Appellants. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court committed 
error in failing to honor the Rule 56(f) Affidavit as it relates 
to the Counterclaim, and further, even based upon the facts 
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before the trial court, in granting summary judgment as it 
relates to the Counterclaim. Secondly, the undisputed facts 
before the Court clearly indicate that the Plaintiff/Respondent 
in fact held itself out as a bank and mortgage banker and such 
characterization is a violation of the Utah Financial 
Institutions Act, voiding the right of the Plaintiff/Respondent 
to recover fees from the Defendants/Appellants. 
Based upon the standard of review enunciated by the Supreme 
Court, there are genuine issues of fact as it relates both to 
the Plaintiff's Complaint and the Counterclaim of the Defendants/ 
Appellants which should be remanded for trial and justify a 
reversal of the Court's Order granting summary judgment and 
dismissing the Defendants' Counterclaim. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court should reverse 
the Order of the trial court granting summary judgment and 
dismissing the Counterclaim, and remand the matter for discovery 
and trial. The Defendants/Appellants also request that the Court 
rule as a matter of law that the violation of the Utah Financial 
Institutions Act creates a private cause of action and allows the 
Court to void the contract between the Plaintiff/Respondent and 
Defendants/Appellants as it relates to costs, interest, fees and 
expenses. 
DATED this <f\ day of February, 1992. 
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'ANDERSON, ESQ. 
fey for Defendants/Appellants 
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Addendum: Answers to Interrogatories 
Response to Request for Production of Documents 
ADDENDUM 
RICHARD G. ALLEN (A0042), 
CRAIG L. TAYLOR (A4421) and 
STEPHEN C. TINGEY (A4424) of 
RAY, QUINNEY St NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
79 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OOOoo 
BRADFORD GROUP WEST, INC., : 
Plaintiff, : ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES 
v. : 
JAMES F. KERN, an individual, : Civil No. 910900291CV 
I.N. FISHER, an individual, 
and LORAN CORPORATION, a : Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
California corporation, 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
Plaintiff Bradford Group West, Inc. answers Defendants' 
First Set of Interrogatories as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1 
As it relates to the $100,000.00 referred to in 
paragraph 6 of the Plaintiff's Complaint, state specifically where 
that $100,000.00 was shown on any of the documents executed 
between the Plaintiff and the Defendants relating to the 
Construction Loan Agreement dated December 4, 1985. 
ANSWER: The 1988 $100,000 Note does not relate 
specifically to any fee or particular disbursement on the 1985 
construction loan and therefore, is not referred to in any way in 
the 1985 construction loan documents. The $100,000 Note referred 
to in Plaintiff's Complaint came about at the specific request of 
defendants and was accepted in 1988 as payment for the shortfall 
between the amount owed by SLC Limited IV on the construction loan 
and the amount funded by First Security Bank on its permanent, 
take-out loan on the Center Pointe project. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2 
As it relates to any action undertaken by the Plaintiff 
with regard to the Construction Loan Agreement dated December 4, 
1985, state the specific basis upon which the Defendants were 
charged the $100,000,00. 
ANSWER: As stated above, the $100,000 Note referenced in 
Plaintiff's Complaint represents the shortfall between the amount 
owed to Plaintiff on the construction loan and the amount funded 
by First Security Bank on its permanent, take-out loan. 
Therefore, the $100,000 represents unpaid construction loan 
proceeds for which Plaintiff agreed to accept the Note so that 
Defendants could obtain the permanent, take-out financing. 
Assuming Defendants' Interrogatory No. 2 refers to a 
$100,000 fee charged in connection with the construction loan, 
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that fee was negotiated in connection with the construction loan. 
As part of the construction loan, SLC executed a "Second Mortgage 
Endorsement to Construction Loan Commitment" in which SLC agreed 
to pay a $100,000 fee in relation to the construction loan, 
payable on the earlier of the sale or refinance of the Center 
Pointe project or the maturity of the construction loan 
INTERROGATORY NO, 3 
State each and every term identified within the Bylaws, 
Articles of Incorporation, Amended Articles of Incorporation, 
Amended Bylaws, Minutes, Stock Certificates, Stock Transfer 
Ledger, Resolutions, and on all corporate documents of the 
Bradford Group, Inc., or in the alternative, attach all such 
copies to your Answers to these Interrogatories. 
ANSWER; Plaintiff agrees to produce a copy of its 
Articles of Incorporation and its Bylaws at a mutually convenient 
time and place. To the extent this Interrogatory seeks additional 
information, Plaintiff objects on the basis that the Interrogatory 
is vague and unintelligible and overbroad. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4 
Identify each and every federal and state agency with 
whom the Bradford Group has registered from 1985 to the present 
date. With regard to each such entity, state the following: 
a. State the name, address and file or case number, 
if applicable; 
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b. State specifically the date of the registration; 
c. State specifically the title, status, license, 
or registrations sought; 
d. Identify the date of the response from the 
federal or state agency; 
e. Identify all documents in your possession which 
evidence your answer to these Interrogatories, 
ANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the 
basis that it is vague and ambiguous. Plaintiff makes numerous 
filings with state and federal agencies in relation to income 
taxes, business taxes, unemployment taxes and other 
responsibilities common to most corporations and employers. In 
addition, Plaintiff is licensed by the State of Nevada as a 
mortgage company. Plaintiff agrees to produce its files and 
records in relation to this license at a mutually convenient time 
and place. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5 
Without limiting the generality of the prior 
interrogatory, state specifically whether the Bradford Group has 
ever filed or registered with the Utah Department of Financial 
Institutions. If you claim that you have filed or registered with 
that agency, state the following: 
a. State the date of the registration; 
b. State the specific contents of any registration 
documents; 
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c. State whether or not you are in fact registered 
or certified with the Department of Financial 
Institutions, and if so, state the date thereof; 
d. Identify all documents in your possession which 
evidence your answer to these Interrogatories. 
ANSWER: No filing has ever been required or made. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6 
State specifically the authority the Plaintiff obtained 
to use the words "bank", "banker", or "banking" in association 
with its names and on its letterhead and associated documents. 
ANSWER: Plaintiff uses the term "realty investment 
banker" in its correspondence to identify its business. No 
authority to use that term is necessary other than Plaintiff's 
authority to do business as a corporation in the State of Utah. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7 
As it relates to the business transaction between the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant from the date of the construction loan 
documents of December 4, 1985 to the present, state the following: 
a. Identify all monies collected from the Defendant 
relating to loan origination fees, extension fees, legal 
fees, late charges, and interest relating to any said 
fees which the Defendants have paid and state the 
following: 
b. State the date of the payment; 
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c. State the amount of the payment; 
d. State specifically the Plaintiff's construction 
of that charge, legal fee, construction loan fee, 
extension fee or the like; 
e. Identify all documents in your possession which 
evidence your answer to these Interrogatories. 
ANSWER: The answers to this Interrogatory may be derived 
from the business records of Plaintiff, and the burden of deriving 
such answers is substantially the same for the Defendants as it is 
for Plaintiff. Plaintiff elects and agrees to produce the payment 
records relating to the construction loan at a mutually convenient 
time and place. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8 
As it relates to all advertising of any type or nature 
undertaken within the State of Utah from 1985 to the present, 
state the following: 
a. State specifically the medium through which the 
advertising was distributed, newspaper, magazine, 
mailing, etc. 
b. State the content of each and every 
advertisement; 
c. Identify all documents in your possession which 
evidence your answer to these Interrogatories; 
d. State the name, address and telephone number of 
the entity who prepared the advertisement, or who has 
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custody of the documents relating to the specific 
contents of the advertisement. 
ANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the 
basis that it is overbroad. Additionally, Plaintiff objects on 
the basis that the request for advertising is vague and 
ambiguous. Plaintiff has placed magazine advertisements on two 
occasions in the last eleven years. Plaintiff agrees to produce 
copies of this advertising. No other advertising has been 
distributed by Plaintiff. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9 
With regard to all transactions entered into by the 
Plaintiff in the State of Utah from 1985 to the present in which 
the Plaintiff has used the term "bank", "banker", or "banking" in 
association with its name, on its letterhead and in its 
advertisement, state the following: 
a. State the names, addresses and telephone numbers 
of the principals with whom the Plaintiff dealt; 
b. State specifically the property location 
associated with the transaction; 
c. State the name, address and telephone number of 
the person who is the custodian of the records of the 
Plaintiff relating to that transaction. 
ANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory as being 
overbroad and burdensome and not designed to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence. 
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DATED thi s 2t day of March, 1991. 
AS TO OBJECTIONS: 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
CfllA 
£ 
Richard G. Allen 
Craig L. Taylor 
Stephen C. Tingey 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
John A. Clawson, being duly sworn, deposes and says that 
he is the President of Bradford Group West, Inc., that he has read 
the foregoing Answers to Interrogatories and knows the contents 
thereof, that the same are true of his own knowledge, and that he 
is authorized to sign this verification on behalf of Bradford 
Group West, Inc. 
BRADFORD GROUP WEST, INC. 
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Subscribed and Sworn to before me this *~l day of March,  23iL> 
1991 , 
A 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
SCT+1293 
N o t a r y ^ubl( 
R e s i d i n g a t " S a l t Lake C i t y - ^ U t a h 
U AAz, 
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RICHARD G. ALLEN (A0042), 
CRAIG L. TAYLOR (A4421) and 
STEPHEN C. TINGEY (A4424) of 
RAY, QUINNEY Sc NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
79 South Main Street 
P. O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OOOoo 
BRADFORD GROUP WEST, INC., : 
Plaintiff, : RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
v. : 
JAMES F. KERN, an individual, : Civil No. 910900291CV 
I.N. FISHER, an individual, 
and LORAN CORPORATION, a : Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
California corporation, 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
Plaintiff Bradford Group West, Inc. responds to Request 
for Production of Documents as follows: 
REQUEST NO. 1 
All documents referenced in Defendants' First Set of 
Interrogatories. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to this request (i) to the 
extent that such request seeks the disclosure of privileged 
attorney-client communications; and (ii) to the extent that such 
request seeks the disclosure of privileged work product as defined 
by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Subject to the foregoing 
objection, Plaintiff agrees to produce all discoverable, 
responsive documents in its possession, 
REQUEST NO. 2 
All documents of every type or nature within your 
possession which relate to the transaction with the Defendant from 
the execution of the construction loan documents on December 4, 
1985 to the present. Without limiting the generality of the 
request, specific request is made for all contracts, attachments, 
notes, trust deeds, guarantees, correspondence, files, 
inter-office memoranda or work papers. 
RESPONSE: See Response to Request No. 1 above. 
REQUEST NO. 3 
All documents within the Plaintiff's possession relating 
to the loan arrangements with the Defendant originating with the 
Loan Agreement dated December 4, 1985 and as it specifically 
relates to monies the Plaintiff obtained to finance said loan from 
Dime Bank, any other banks including banks specifically located in 
Idaho. 
RESPONSE: See Response to Request No. 1 above. 
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DATED this day of March, 1991. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Richard G. Allen 
Craig L. Taylor 
Stephen C. Tingey 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
SCT+1294 
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